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CRITIQUE ON
"THE CONSTITUTION AND JOB DISCRIMINATION"
WILLIAM R. MING, JR.*
The Countryman basic thesis is sound. His analysis of the obli-
gations of the several states is intriguing. But the history and nature
of the problem of discrimination against Negroes in employment
suggest that more be said of law and legal institutions in this area.
To begin with it should be observed that the developments of the
law in this area, as compared with developments in the other major
civil rights fields of education, public housing, public accommodation
and voting, have been vitally affected by past social and political
decisions and events. More than twenty-five years ago under the
leadership of Charles H. Houston Esq., of the Washington Bar, first
Special Counsel of the NAACP, and former dean of the Law School
of Howard University, the National Legal Committee of the NAACP
launched a calculated attack on racial discrimination in the United
States. The prime targets were racial discrimination in education
and the denial to Negroes of the right to vote. The weapons of the
attack were constitutional arguments buttressed by such showing of
the effects of racial discrimination as was provided by social scientists.
The weapons were fired in cases seeking injunctive relief, declaratory
judgment or damages, or all three, on behalf of specifically identified
Negro plaintiffs and the class of persons they represented. Most of
the suits, for obvious reasons, were brought in federal courts. Fre-
quently the procedural devices used required more skillful legal at-
tention than did the substantive problems involved because the
Anglo-American legal system had not before been used to redress
the wrongs of millions of people any more than international law had
been used prior to World War II to punish genocide.
In retrospect it might be argued that the prime target of such a
legal program should have been the discrimination against Negroes in
employment. Certainly it would have been naive to ignore the social
* Attorney, Chicago, Illinois; partner, McCoy, Ming & Leighton; member, Exec-
utive Committee, National Board of Directors, NAACP; member, National Legal
Committee, NAACP; Chairman, Advisory Committee, NAACP Legal Redress and
Education Fund, Inc.
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truism that people who are hungry can hardly be expected to ap-
preciate the values of either education or the franchise. Moreover,
the impact of employment discrimination in the '30's was even greater
than it is today. But even in retrospect it must be observed that the
New Deal offered promises of improvement in economic conditions
for all Americans, including Negroes. Similarly, local, state and federal
relief programs assured marginal creature comforts even for Negroes.
Thus it appeared that if the courts outlawed the use of governmental
power to maintain racial discrimination, Negroes, like whites, would
benefit from whatever economic gains were achieved in the country
as a whole. If the right to vote were secure political action could
hold gains won and improved educational opportunities would provide
both a means of individual development and acceptance of the ideas
of racial equality by the white community.
To some extent these goals have been approached. Both the median
and average of income of Negroes has risen since the grim depression
days. Proportionately more Negroes are regularly employed today
than were so employed in the '30's. More Negroes are employed
today in professional technical, skilled and semi-skilled occupations
than there were in the '30's. The Newsweek poll of whites this past
summer reports that currently eighty per cent of whites believe that
the law should guarantee Negroes equal rights to whites in job op-
portunities; ninety-five per cent to equal rights in voting; eighty-five
per cent to equal rights in getting good housing (but not in white
neighborhoods); ninety-one per cent to equal rights in using buses
and trains; seventy-five per cent to equal rights in using restaurants
and lunch counters; and seventy-five per cent to equal rights in
giving their children integrated schooling.1
Nevertheless, as Dean Countryman points out, the burden of un-
employment in the United States still falls doubly hard on Negroes.
It merits notice in this regard that when slavery was abolished
there were four million slaves, all of whom were Negroes. Ironically,
the President of the United States reported only the other day that
there are now about four million unemployed persons in the United
States. Only a third of these are Negroes. But there can be small
consolation either to Negroes or whites who are unemployed that the
disinherited group of Americans is now bi-racial. Actually, the con-
sideration of national averages tends to be misleading as to the nature
1 Newsweek, October 21, 1963, Vol. LXII, No. 17, 45-57.
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of the problem of job discrimination. While it is true that the national
non-white unemployment rate is double that of whites this really only
means that there are fewer unemployed Negroes proportionately in
West Virginia than there are in New York, Illinois or Pennsylvania.
Thus in Chicago currently forty-three per cent of the Negro labor
force is unemployed. Unemployment among Negro males between
twenty-five and forty-five ranges from sixteen to eighteen per cent
as compared to two point two per cent for whites in the same age
bracket. Whites in Chicago experience only the normal unemployment
resulting from short periods of lay-offs and changing of jobs similar
to the conditions that existed during World War II, while unemploy-
ment among Negroes is at a depression level. The impact of this
unemployment is heightened because the median age for Negroes in
Chicago is only twenty-five years as compared to thirty-six years
for whites. According to the 1960 census there were nearly fifty-
five thousand Negro males in Chicago in the under twenty-nine age
bracket, and nearly twenty-five thousand additional Negro males
have become eighteen and entered the labor force since 1960.2 Reports
from other northern urban centers convey the same grim picture and
more than one-half of the Negroes in the United States live in the
North.
Social scientists, politicians and commentators may differ as to the
remedy for Negro unemployment. But even the dullest of us must
recognize that no matter how manifested, whether in crime, demon-
strations, mental breakdowns, or simply despair, this enormous lack
of opportunity to earn a living is a socially destructive force from
which even racial segregation, residential and otherwise, cannot shield
the white community.
In this area contemplation of detailed facts alone is hardly sufficient.
Moreover, legal scholars have always been notorious for their prefer-
ence for the general proposition as a subject for discussion.3 But
2 Nicholas, labor economist, Job Development Specialist for the Employment Guid-
ance Department of the Chicago Urban League, Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship
Committee, (N.D. Ill. October 16, 1963).
- Holmes-Pollock Letters, Harvard 1941, 13-14, and 17-18. Holmes to Pollock,
Washington, May 26, 1919: "Brandeis the other day drove a harpoon into my midriff
with reference to my summer occupations. He said you talk about improving your
mind, you only exercise it on the subjects with which you are familiar. Why don't
you try something new, study some domain of fact. Take up the textile industries
in Massachusetts and after reading the reports sufficiently you can go to Lawrence
and get a human notion of how it really is. I hate facts. I always say the chief
end of man is to form general propositions-adding that no general proposition is
worth a damn. Of course, a general proposition is simply a string for the facts and
I have little doubt that it would be good for my immortal soul to plunge into them,
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the current social and political pressures for solution of civil rights
problems must compel serious students of the law and legal institutions
to recognize that if the customary processes of resolving controversies
do not provide a ready remedy for these major social ills, the
alternatives are disorder, violence and the inevitable repressive ac-
tion by the government which would destroy the basic American
concepts of individual liberty and the right to individual development
and expression.
Dean Countryman has endeavored to meet this challenge by an
imaginative analysis of the concept of "state action" within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment. He would conclude that the
failure of a state to provide a remedy for job discrimination against
Negroes was itself a denial of the equal protection of the laws required
by the fourteenth amendment. In addition, he convincingly articulates
the constitutional basis for a federal statute prohibiting racial dis-
crimination in employment.
It is doubtful that any serious legal question can be raised as to
the constitutionality of a federal fair employment practice measure.
It really seems immaterial whether the federal authority arises from
the commerce clause, the thirteenth or fourteenth amendment, the
fifth amendment or a combination of these. The Wagner Act, its
subsequent amendments, and the judicial decisions in the field of
labor relations have made it clear that this is an area of broad, and
to some extent, at least, exclusive federal authority.
It is not so easy to support Dean Countryman's thesis as to the
obligation of the several states to act to redress job discrimination.
The real difficulty arises from the fact that starting in 1873 the Su-
preme Court of the United States systematically gutted the fourteenth
good also for the performance of my duties, but I shrink from the bore-or rather
I hate to give up the chance to read this and that, that a gentleman should have read
before he dies. I don't remember that I read Michiavelli's PRmNcE-and I think of
the Day of Judgment. There are a good many worse ignorances than that, that ought
to be closed up. I don't know how it will come out." Holmes to Pollock, Beverly
Farms, June 27, 1919: "I am glad that you don't treat my proposed excursion into
facts as of the essence of salvation. I have sent for books but ten days have gone
by without answer. I think of a Catholic lady who on a fast day called for a bass,
then terrapin-not forthcoming-and then said, 'Bring me a mutton chop. God knows
I have tried for fish.' If I am destined to lapse from facts."2
2 It appears from Holmes's Journal that during the summer he read the Report on
the Strike of Textile Workers in Lawrence, Sen. Dec. 870, 62nd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1912) and Summary of the Report o; Condition of Women and Child Wage
Earners in the United States.
NoTE: The editor of the letters reported, page 17, that the Pollock letter referred
to in the Holmes letter of June 27 is missing.
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amendment.' The Court was aided and abetted in this process by
politicians, historians, political scientists, and others, who ignored
the facts and distorted the legislative intentions of the framers of the
Civil War amendments. The most surprising thing is that the country
generally supinely permitted this transformation of a good faith effort
to root out slavery and install the freed slaves as the political and
social equals of other American citizens into a legal system which
affirmed the power of the majority to use the instruments of govern-
ment to maintain citizenship of two classes, one for whites and the
other for Negroes. Beginning with Shelley v. Kraemer,' however, the
Supreme Court appears to be attempting the long "advance" to 1868.
Whether the courts alone can overcome the inevitable inertia of the
common law case by case system to say nothing of the efforts of
commentators and proponents of the status quo to deter the court,
remains to be seen. It is ironic, to say the least, however, to find a
full century after the Emancipation Proclamation that we are so far
from the political and social goals of the 39th Congress. The speed
with which it acted to outlaw the "Black Codes" of 1865 suggests
that the Countryman thesis would have found a receptive audience
there.
Dean Countryman, with admirable candor, has stated some of his
biases and assumptions in aid of understanding his thesis. I share
those biases. To equal his candor I suppose I must disclose additional
biases. First, of course, there is my long, friendly association with,
and admiration for, Dean Countryman. Then, entirely obvious, is
my personal stake in the subject of these discussions. I trust, however,
that neither of these impairs analysis of the problems at hand. More
important, I suspect, is my aversion for those who would drown action
with words. To paraphrase Sir Winston Churchill, it may be said
of civil rights problems that seldom have so many talked so much
about the work done by so few. Indeed we have now descended to a
second level where scholarship takes the form of talk about the talk.6
It is particularly distressing when, under the guise of scholarly dis-
cussion of the plain purposes of the Civil War amendments, com-
mentators seek to develop and invoke limitations on judicial power
and concepts of "balancing" which, if followed, would inevitably
4 For a detailed analysis see II CROSSKEY POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1083-1158, 1953
5Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
6 See, e.g., Gordon, "Recent Trends in the Study of Minority and Race Relations,"
The Annals. Vol. 350, November 1963; pp. 148-156.
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block off the small inroads which have been made on the concept of
absolute right of the majority.
This is not to say that there are no areas open for scholarly inquiry
into the role of law and the legal institutions in dealing with civil
rights problems, particularly in the area of job discrimination. Indeed,
intensive study is dictated by the complex of factors involved here,
arising from the variations in the aims and goals of sometimes con-
flicting, sometimes competing, often concurring, forces of unions,
employers, government and capital sources in comparison to the
simply stated goal of Negroes to secure merit employment.
Actually even this simple statement is complicated by the enormous
variation in training and skills currently found among Negroes. Some
of this is due to past discrimination in education, training and
employment opportunities. But some is due to the inevitable inter-
personal differences among Negroes in capacity, goals and desire.
These differences, in turn, of course, are grossly affected by racial
discrimination.
It is important, perhaps even crucial, to notice that here, unlike
the matters of access to the theatre or dining room, or suburban house,
or school, or voting booth, color is not the only determinant. It is also
important to observe that the problems in this area arise from job
discrimination, not total exclusion of Negroes from economic oppor-
tunity even though limited. Just as the horror of the Dred Scott
decision must be viewed in light of the fact that there were already
about two hundred fifty thousand Negro free men at the time of
the Emancipation Proclamation so too comparative Negro income
statistics must be read in 1963 in light of the fact that all Negroes
are not unskilled field hands recently displaced from cotton fields
by automation.
In any event I would urge that the role of law and legal institutions
in the area of job discrimination be considered from several points
of view.
To begin with it is perfectly clear that post-depression developments
with respect to trade unions have had a marked effect on the problem.
Prior to the development of the industrial unions exclusion of Negroes
from labor unions was the rule. As a result the Negro work force was
readily available for strike-breaking and elements of it were frequently
so used. Indeed in some quarters, both Negro and white, the National
Urban League still suffers from the charge, merited or not, that one
19641
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of its purposes was to facilitate the use of Negroes as strike-breakers.
With the formation of the CIO and its organization of workers in
industries where there were large numbers of Negroes employed,
many observers believed that industrial unions would become a potent
force for the elimination of job discrimination against Negroes. The
extent of the disillusionment in this regard is epitomized by the
bitterness of A. Phillip Randolph, a life long trade unionist, and his
organization of the Negro-American Labor Council. Of equal signifi-
cance in this regard is the increasing NAACP criticism of trade unions.
This is particularly illuminating since many of these unions have
been among the loudest of the advocates of civil rights, generally,
while they simultaneously discriminate against Negro members with
a skill matched only by that of southern politicians Meanwhile, craft
unions which formerly only excluded Negroes from membership, now
by dint of combination with state and federal officials prevent Negroes
from learning certain trades even in public vocation schools.'
This is not to say that unions alone are to blame for job discrimina-
tion though some employers so contend. A measure of the attitude
of employers can be found in the discriminatory practices in employ-
ment in unorganized areas and with respect to nonunion employees.
Dean Countryman has pointed out some legal remedies already
provided for job discrimination. These and other factors suggest that
analysis of the role of law with respect to job discrimination might
profitably proceed by considering separately:
1. Discrimination against Negroes in public employment;
2. Discrimination against Negroes in employment on government
contracts; and
3. Discrimination against Negroes in other private employment.
On another plane those topics might again be subdivided as follows:
1. Discrimination in hiring.
2. Discrimination in on-the-job-training and upgrading.
3. Discrimination in tenure.
7 See, generally, Marshall, "Ethnic and Economic Minorities: Unions Future or
Unrecruitable?", The Annals, Vol. 350, November 1963; pp. 63-73.
8 See, e.g., Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Committee, supra note 2, where prelim-
inary injunction was issued, Oct. 16, 1963, to compel acceptance of Negro applicants
as ironworker apprentices where academic instruction is provided in a Chicago public
school under a program jointly sponsored by state and federal governments and where
the applicants were denied employment by union fiat in construction of a United
States courthouse and office building in Chicago.
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On still another plane there might be a useful breakdown as between
industries, geographic areas, and character of employment as pro-
fessional, technical, skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled.
The development of the law and the role of legal institutions seems
to have varied considerably among these several categories. For ex-
ample an almost immediate by-product of the legal attack on dis-
crimination in education even prior to World War II was the general
recognition by the courts both state and federal, that equal salaries
for white and Negro teachers were compelled by constitutional re-
quirements. Indeed, even the expiration of a one year contract before
judgment was held not to make moot a suit by a Negro teacher to
compel equal salaries.9
Underlying these decisions was the obvious proposition that denial
to Negroes of equal employment opportunities in public employment
violated constitutional limitations. Some states have statutes to this
effect.1" Interestingly, even without lawsuits, many southern commun-
ities have conceded this requirement, particularly with respect to Negro
police officers. Enforcement of this obvious constitutional requirement
of equal job opportunity in public employment state and federal,
however is far from uniform.
Discrimination on account of color by trade unions with respect to
persons already employed in a unit designated as such for collective
bargaining seems also to be prohibited by law. Denial of union mem-
bership, however, on account of race or color may still have no
authoritative remedy.11
After erection by the National Labor Relations Board of a "facade
of lofty sentiments" with a performance record of "distinctly minor
achievement, characterized by numerous temporizations with seem-
9 Alston v. Board of Educ. of City of Norfolk, 112 F2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940).
10 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STATS., 1961, ch. 38, § 13-2(c). But see In re Taylor, Ill.
FEPC, Charge No. 62-1; 8 RRLR 319 (1962). There a trial examiner concluded
the Commission had no jurisdiction over a complaint by a Negro teacher that because
of her race she had been denied employment by a Chicago public junior college,
because it was a public body, though he also found in her favor on the merits. More
than a year after his report the matter remains unresolved by the Commission I
11 See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) and Syves v.
Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1956) reversing 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955). In light
of the introductory comment as to Mr. Houston, it should be noted that he was
counsel for petitioner in Steele as he was also in Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944). See generally, Wellington,
The Constitution, the Labor Union, and Governmental Action, 70 YALE L. J. 345;
Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 563; Blumrosen, Legal Protection Against Exclusion from Union Activities,
22 OHxo ST. L.J. 21; Rauh, Civil Rights and Liberties and Labor Unions, 8 LAB. L.J.
874, Hewitt, The Right to Membership in a Labor Union, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 919;
Weiss, Federal Remedies for Racial Discrimination by Labor Unions 50 GEO. L.J. 457.
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ingly basic principles of democracy"' 2 the general counsel of the
Board has announced a policy of giving "solid support to efforts to
provide equal representation where the rights invoked are intended
to be protected under industrial relations principles defined in the
NLRA.,,)13
Dean Countryman has alluded to another area where there has been
federal action with respect to job discrimination, namely in the field
of government contracts. Even to that limited extent, the rights of
individuals to judicial remedy when they are discriminated against is
not settled. The major feature of the federal action to date is the
non-discrimination clause required in all government contracts. Some
states and cities have similar requirements.
The right of individuals discriminated against however, in violation
of such contract provisions till now, has been limited to administrative
remedy. The refusal of the courts, so far, to apply orthodox notions
of the rights of third parties beneficiary to enforce contracts made for
their benefit in this situation raises the always perplexing problem of
the propriety of using private law concepts to resolve public contro-
versies. 4 It is clear that the contract clauses are wholly for the
benefit of the people as to whom discrimination is usually practiced.
It is equally clear that the contract clause is an effort by the executive
branch of the government to exercise its limited law making function
in a situation where the Congress has failed or refused to act. Thus
there is room for argument that individuals are limited to the admin-
istrative remedies provided by the executive because the doctrine of
separation of powers bars creation of a judicial remedy by action of the
executive. A recent amendment to the Judiciary Act suggests other-
wise but there is as yet, no authoritative resolution of the matter.
Dean Countryman has proposed a remedy for job discrimination in
private employment generally. Besides the constitutional issue he
raises, some caveat seems required as to the efficacy of administrative
action in this field, as in others. The conciliation, "social work" tech-
nique is of dubious value when dealing with able, crafty, evasive
12 Aaron and Komoffe, Statutory Regulation of Individual Internal Union Affairs,
44 ILL. L. Rav. 425,445 (1949).
3 Calendar Year Report of the Office of the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board, December 31, 1962, 8 RRLR 313, 314. The report cautiously adds:
"Where they are not subsumed under the remedial provisions of this statute, of
course, our hands will be tied."
14 See, e.g., Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Committee, supra note 2; and Farmer
v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 215 F. Supp. 729 (E.D.Pa. 1963).
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union and management people. Inestimable delay is characteristic of
any administrative system without well-defined procedural and sub-
stantive rules. Overall, lack of commitment to resolution of issues
for the benefit of individuals bars real remedy for the individual who
seeks only a job or up-grading.
In any event, the whole area, constitutional and otherwise, appears
to warrant intensive investigation.
It would appear that any discussion of the role of law in connection
with job discrimination must consider the totality of the problem of
unemployment in the United States. As Walter Lippmann pointed
out recently:
The economic grievances of the Negroes cannot be redressed on a
racial basis. They are an inseparable part of the national problem of
how to stimulate the American economy-how to provide that much
higher standard of life which is within the capacity of our technology,
our resources, our capital reserves, and our labor force. Here there
is no near prospect of a big advance. In the Congress the conservative
coalition opposes the measures which in the experience of the more
advanced countries of the world are conducive to rapid and sustained
economic growth. To this opposing coalition a preponderant mass of
the voters are giving at least tacit assent-some because they agree
with the conservative coalition and some because they do not under-
stand the alternatives.' 5
In July 1963 the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that there
were approximately four million three hundred thousand unemployed
persons in the United States. Of this number more than nine hundred
thousand had been unemployed for fifteen weeks or longer. Also, of
the total more than nine hundred thousand were non-white, mostly
Negroes. Of the unemployed non-whites more than thirty-two per
cent had been unemployed for more than fifteen weeks.
The President of the United States has proposed immediately only
a tax reduction in aid of solution of this problem. Without regard to
the merits of this proposal it is obvious that there can be no real
solution of the problem of job discrimination by law or otherwise in
the absence of an upsurge in the American economy which will increase
the demand for labor, both white and black, by some two to three
million jobs.
This is probably not the forum for a debate on the respective merits
of the views of the "liberal" economists and the "Keynesians," nor
would it seem possible here to analyze the relative effects of automa-
15 Newsweek, September 16, 1963, p. 21.
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tion and the proposals for a compulsory shorter work week. The real
social fact is that Negroes in the United States both as individuals
and en masse, have all the problems that other Americans have. In
addition they bear the burdens of the problems arising from racial
discrimination. To the extent that these are based on color only, law
and legal institutions can and must provide certain and rapid remedies.
But overall resolution of the problem of job discrimination on account
of race cannot be achieved short of solution of economic problems
heretofore regarded as admitting of only limited activity by law and
legal institutions.
